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a  b  s  t  r  a  c  t
This article  explores  whether  old,  incumbent  industries  can  prevent  new,  green  industries  from  emerging
by studying  the  rise  and  fall of  the  Norwegian  advanced  biofuel  sector.  It investigates  three  competing
explanations  that have  been  proposed  to account  for  why Norway  failed  to develop  a vibrant  industry
within  this  ﬁeld:  (i) the  petroleum  industry  acquired  all available  risk  capital,  (ii) the  petroleum  indus-
try  captured  all relevant  technological  expertise  and  (iii)  the  government  failed  to  provide  adequate
incentives  and  support  measures.  The  article  applies  a qualitative  event-history  analysis  to chart  the
development  of  the  most  important  Norwegian  advanced  biofuel  companies  – Borregaard  (bioethanol),echnological innovation system
iofuel industry
nvironmental policy
unctional analysis
otors of sustainable innovation
Cambi  (biogas),  Weyland  (bioethanol)  and  Xynergo  (biodiesel)  –  and  uses  their success  and  eventual  fail-
ure as  a  key indicator  of the condition  of  the  emerging  technological  innovation  system  within  this  ﬁeld.
The  article ﬁnds  that the advanced  biofuel  companies  were  hampered  mostly  by  inconsistent  and  unpre-
dictable  government  incentives,  and  concludes  that  the  third  explanation  best accounts  for  Norway’s
limited  success  in  advanced  biofuels.
Publis© 2016  The  Author(s).  
. Introduction
Norway needs, in the coming years, to transform its economy.
he Norwegian economy is currently rigged towards exploiting the
arge petroleum reserves that the country has beneath the North
ea, and its private sector is dominated by ﬁrms that are involved
n exploration, extraction and reﬁnement of oil and gas resources.
evertheless, the petroleum sector will not be able to sustain the
ame level of economic activity in the future since the Norwegian
il and gas supplies are declining and the use of fossil fuels must
e reduced to meet international emission reduction targets. Many
ommentators have suggested that Norway could solve this prob-
em if it managed to convince its companies to switch focus from
ossil resources to renewable energy. However, Norway has so far
truggled to develop viable green industries [1], even in areas where
atural resources should have provided the country with a com-
arative advantage – such as advanced biofuels and offshore wind
ower. This has led some commentators to suggest that the success
hich Norway enjoys in the petroleum industry has somehow pre-
ented it from developing new green industries. This article aims to
∗ Corresponding author.
E-mail addresses: arne.fevolden@nifu.no (A.M. Fevolden), antje.klitkou@nifu.no
A. Klitkou).
ttp://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.erss.2016.10.010
214-6296/© 2016 The Author(s). Published by Elsevier Ltd. This is an open access articl
.0/).hed  by  Elsevier  Ltd.  This  is  an open  access  article  under  the  CC  BY-NC-ND
license (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/).
contribute to this debate about whether old, incumbent industries
can prevent new, green industries from emerging, by explaining
why Norway failed to develop a vibrant advanced biofuel industry.
Three competing explanations have been proposed – by
researchers, investors and policy makers – to account for Norway’s
lacklustre performance in advanced biofuels [2–4]. The ﬁrst expla-
nation claims that the oil sector is so resource demanding that
there simply is no available risk capital to fund promising advanced
biofuel projects in Norway. The second explanation maintains that
Norway has a knowledge base that is so entrenched in hydrocarbon
extraction that the country simply lacks the relevant technological
expertise to successfully exploit advanced biofuel opportunities.
And the third explanation states that the Norwegian government
has failed to provide adequate incentives and support measures
to stimulate the development and production of advanced biofuel.
This article explores which, if any, of these explanations are true.
This article investigates the validity of the three explanations
by exploring the formation of technological innovation systems
(TIS) for the production of three types of advanced biofuels:
advanced bioethanol, biodiesel and biogas. It applies the techno-
logical innovation system approach [5,6] in combination with a
qualitative event-history analysis [7,8] to track the development
of the main Norwegian companies working in these ﬁelds – Bor-
regaard (bioethanol), Cambi (biogas), Weyland (bioethanol), and
Xynergo (biodiesel). These companies’ endeavours comprise prac-
e under the CC BY-NC-ND license (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/
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ically all of Norway’s commercial activity in advanced biofuels, and
hey therefore serve as a good starting point for unravelling the
ider technological innovation system within these ﬁelds, which
nclude a broad range of actors, institutions, and technologies.
The article applies the TIS perspective to test the validity of
peciﬁc explanations rather than to explain general patterns of
echnological development, diffusion and deployment. The article
dopts this approach because it aims to contribute to an ongo-
ng debate about the lacklustre performance of the Norwegian
dvanced biofuels industry, rather than to provide a complete
escription of all Norwegian activity in advanced biofuels. The arti-
le follows the TIS perspective and assumes that (seven) processes
xist – referred to as ‘functions’ in the TIS perspective [7] – that
ould have contributed to a successful development of the Norwe-
ian advanced biofuels industry. However, the article also assumes
hat some weaknesses were present in the Norwegian advanced
iofuels industry – a lack of risk capital, a lack of expertise or insuf-
cient government support – that prevent this from happening and
hat these weaknesses can be identiﬁed as failures in one or more
f the interacting system functions.
The analysis carried out in this article ﬁnds considerable sup-
ort for the third explanation (policy failure) but only some support
or the ﬁrst (lack of risk capital) and the second explanation (lack
f relevant knowledge). Although there were examples of Nor-
egian companies struggling to raise capital and develop new
echnologies, the analysis reveals that the Norwegian companies
ere generally able to develop their own processing technologies
nd raise sufﬁcient funds to demonstrate them. The analysis ﬁnds,
n the other hand, that the Norwegian government failed to estab-
ish a reliable and predictable policy regime and that this failure put
everal biofuel companies out of business and scared off investors.
Although the focus of this article is on the Norwegian advanced
iofuel industry, the aim of the article is to contribute to a wider
ebate about whether old, incumbent industries can prevent new,
reen industries from emerging [9,10]. This debate is not solely
elevant to Norway, but also for other countries which are try-
ng to establish green industries upon an industrial base that is
eavily invested in a fossil energy regime, which is the case for
any European countries [11]. The existing literature points out
hat old, incumbent industries can have both a positive and a neg-
tive inﬂuence on new, green industries. They can prevent new,
reen industries from emerging through competition and political
obbying [12,13] or they can facilitate the growth of new, green
ndustries by providing access to technology, markets and capi-
al [14] (see also discussion in [15]. Within the TIS literature this
ilemma has recently been described as one of ‘external links’ and
structural coupling,’ where an emerging industry is affected by or
s part of development processes in another technological innova-
ion system [16]. Nevertheless, only limited empirical work has so
ar been conducted on this topic, and this article aims at helping to
ll this research gap.
The article is also related to and further builds upon several
ecent contributions in Energy Research & Social Science that have
iscussed the development and deployment of biofuels [17,18],
nd it addresses several of the questions that Energy Research &
ocial Science aims to answer, such as “what are the most effective
trategies for catalysing private sector investment in innovative
ow- or no-GHG emissions technologies” and “what are some of
he endogenous and exogenous causes of failed energy innovation”
19].
The article is organised as follows: Section 2 presents the ana-
ytical framework adopted in this study, while Section 3 presents
he methods; Section 4 provides some technological background
nformation; Section 5 presents the event history analysis, while
ection 6 discusses the main results of this analysis. & Social Science 23 (2017) 125–135
2. Analytical framework
The theoretical starting point for this article is the technologi-
cal innovation system (TIS) approach, which was  introduced in the
1990s by Carlsson and Stànkiewicz [5,6]. Since its inception, the
TIS approach has undergone a series of developments and has been
applied in a number of empirical studies [20–23]. And in recent
years, it has been adapted speciﬁcally to study the dynamics of
emerging technologies and has been used extensively to analyse
renewable energy systems [20,24,7,25–27]. It is its suitability for
analysing emerging technologies and renewable energy systems –
which is the reason that the TIS approach is applied in this article.
The current TIS approach is summarized by Hekkert et al. [7]
as an approach that ‘focuses on the most important processes that
need to take place in the innovation systems to lead successfully to
technology development and diffusion.’ These processes or ‘func-
tions’ are deﬁned by Hekkert and Negro [24] as: (i) Entrepreneurial
activities, (ii) Knowledge development (learning), (iii) Knowledge
diffusion through networks, (iv) Guidance of the search, (v) Market
formation, (vi) Resource mobilisation, and (vii) Creation of legit-
imacy/counteract resistance to change. These functions interact
with each other, and generate positive and negative feedback loops,
through a combination of strong or weak system functions and
strong or weak interactions of functions [26]. These interactions
again determine whether a TIS contributes to the successful devel-
opment and diffusion of a technology.
Although all functions have a part to play in the successful
development and diffusion of a technology, some functions and
interactions between functions can play a more prominent role.
This idea is expressed through Suurs’s concept of ‘motors of innova-
tion’ [26]. Suurs describes the ‘motors of innovation’ as frequently
occurring forms of cumulative causation or feedback loops gen-
erated by a speciﬁc set of interacting system functions. Suurs
distinguishes between four different types of motors: the ‘Sci-
ence and technology push motor’, the ‘Entrepreneurial motor’, the
‘System building motor’ and the ‘Market motor’. Each of these
motors highlights a speciﬁc form of feedback loop that leads to
the successful development and diffusion of a technology by draw-
ing extensively on a subset of interacting system functions. For
instance, the science and technology push motor draws extensively
on knowledge development (ii), knowledge diffusion through net-
works (iii), guidance of the search (iv) and resource mobilisation
(vi). This motor might start with expectations of a positive research
outcome (iv), which leads to public R&D (vi), which leads to tech-
nological development and diffusion (ii & iii), which again lead to
greater expectations of positive research outcomes (iv) and more
public and private funding for R&D (and so on).
Our theoretical conjectures are derived from the idea of motors,
but we  approach the concept from a different angle. Rather than
thinking that there are some interacting system functions which
serve as the main drivers of the development and diffusion of a
technology, we  envision that there are some interacting system
functions which serve as the main impediments to the develop-
ment and diffusion of a technology. We  envision that some parts of
the TIS might contain weaknesses that are so substantial and far-
reaching that the system as a whole grinds to a halt – creating, if
you will, a ‘motor failure.’ In the example above with the science
and technology push motor, we  could envision a positive feedback
loop between positive research outcomes (iv) public R&D (vi) and
technological development and diffusion (ii and iii). Nevertheless,
we might also envision that this positive feedback loop collapses –to fund demonstration plants and commercialize the technology.
In this article, we use the TIS approach to test the validity of the
claims that the lacklustre performance of the Norwegian advanced
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Table  1
Failures and System Functions.
Failure I:lack of risk capital Failure II:lack of expertise Failure III:lack of government support
1. Entrepreneurial activities X
2.  Knowledge development and learning processes X
3.  Knowledge diffusion through networks X
4.  Guidance of the search X
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o5.  Market formation 
6.  Resource mobilisation X 
7.  The creation of legitimacy and counteracting resistance to change 
iofuels industry is due to a lack of risk capital, a lack of expertise
r insufﬁcient government support. To test the validity of these
xplanations, we develop three types of failures that correspond
o each of these three explanations – a capital shortage failure, an
bsence of expertise failure and a policy insufﬁciency failure. We
ssume, as in Suurs’s concept of motors of innovation [26], that
ome functions and interactions between functions play a more
rominent role in these failures, and we assign a set of dominant
nteracting system functions to each of these three failures, based
n the type of processes that they indicate as having hampered
he development of the Norwegian advanced biofuel industry (see
able 1).
We investigate the ﬁrst explanation – that there was  not enough
vailable risk capital to fund promising advanced biofuel projects in
orway – by examining whether there existed a ‘capital shortage’
ailure that was dominated by the functions ‘resource mobilisation’
nd ‘entrepreneurial activities’. Resource mobilisation is a func-
ion that refers to the availability of ﬁnancial, human and natural
esources within a TIS. Entrepreneurial activities, on the other hand,
s a function that refers to the presence of projects aimed at turn-
ng these resources into an “emerging technology in a practical
nd/or commercial environment” [26]. Concerning this failure, it is
he availability of ﬁnancial capital and the ability of entrepreneurs
o produce viable business cases for advanced biofuels that are the
ost important factors. We assume that this failure is present if the
dvanced biofuels industry develops successfully until an acute lack
f ﬁnancial capital and entrepreneurial activity brings the system
o a halt.
We investigate the second explanation – that Norway lacked
elevant technological expertise to successfully exploit advanced
iofuel opportunities – by examining whether an ‘absence of
xpertise’ failure existed that was dominated by the functions
knowledge development,’ ‘knowledge diffusion’ and ‘resource
obilisation’. Knowledge development is a function that refers
o learning processes related to a technology, occurring through
ctivities such as basic research and development, laboratory
xperiments and adoption trials. Knowledge diffusion, on the other
and, is a function that refers to network activities where het-
rogeneous agents exchange knowledge, such as conferences and
orkshops. Finally, ‘resource mobilisation’ is the same function as
n the capital shortage failure, but the focus in this failure is on
uman capital rather than ﬁnancial capital. Concerning this failure,
t is the availability of comprehensive and accessible expertise and
he human resources necessary to exploit this knowledge that are
ssential, and we assume that this failure is present if the advanced
iofuels industry develops successfully until an acute lack of exper-
ise on advanced biofuels brings the system to a standstill.
We investigate the third explanation – that the Norwegian
overnment has failed to provide adequate incentives and sup-
ort measures to stimulate the development and production of
dvanced biofuel – by examining whether a ‘policy insufﬁciency’
ailure existed that was dominated by the functions ‘guidance of the
earch,’ ‘market formation,’ ‘the creation of legitimacy and counter-
cting resistance to change’ and ‘resource mobilisation.’ Guidance
f the search is a function that refers to processes of formulat-X
X X
X
ing expectations and visions related to a technology and includes
activities such as formulating R&D priorities, conducting foresight
studies and setting policy targets that are often carried out in con-
junction by ‘governments, technology producers, technology users
and NGOs’ [26]. Market formation, on the other hand, is a function
that refers to support measures that enable emerging technologies
to compete with incumbent technologies in an open market, such as
ﬁnancial support measures, minimal consumption quotas or taxes
on the use of incumbent technologies. The creation of legitimacy
and counteracting resistance to change is a function that refers to
activities that create acceptance and support for an emerging tech-
nology, such as lobbying activities and advisory activities that help
to counteract resistance to change [28,29]. And, ﬁnally, ‘resource
mobilisation’ is the same function as in the previous two failures,
but the focus in this failure is on public funding for RD&D (research,
development and demonstration) rather than ﬁnancial or human
capital. Concerning this failure, it is the existence of clear public
priorities accompanied by targeted public incentive schemes that
are the most important factors, and we  assume that this failure
is present if the advanced biofuels industry develops successfully
until misguided policies or inadequate incentive schemes brings
the system to a halt.
Although we  assign a speciﬁc set of dominant system functions
to each of the three failures, this does not imply that this study is
based on an assumption that these functions operate isolated and
alone. Rather, we assume that system functions not assigned to a
particular failure can both mitigate and exasperate those failures
through positive or negative feedback loops. In essence, we assign
a set of dominant system functions to each of the three failures
to guide the empirical analysis towards crucial processes that –
in conjunction with other processes (functions) – could have led
to the lacklustre performance of the Norwegian advanced biofuels
industry.
What we  have devised could to some extent be described as
a ‘failure framework’ much like that described by Weber and
Rohracher [30] and Woolthuis et al. [31]. Our ‘absence of exper-
tise’ failure, for instance, bears a great deal of resemblance to what
these authors call ‘capabilities failure.’ Nevertheless, while Weber
and Rohracher [30] and Woolthuis et al. [31] aimed to introduce
a failure framework that could help guide policy more generally,
our failure framework has been developed to deal speciﬁcally with
explaining the lacklustre performance of the Norwegian advanced
biofuel industry.
3. Methodology
The article carries out a study of four companies – Cambi, Norske
Skog/Xynergo, Weyland and Borregaard – developing three types
of advanced biofuels – advanced bioethanol, biodiesel and bio-
gas. These companies were chosen because they are the main
Norwegian business players in advanced biofuels and account for
practically all of Norway’s commercial activity within this ﬁeld.
Their success or failure can therefore be seen as a key indicator of
the condition of the emerging TIS for advanced biofuels in Norway.
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Table 2
Operationalization of system functions, adapted from Hekkert & Negro [24].
Event category
Entrepreneurial
activities
Project started
Contractors provide turn-key technology
Project stopped
Lack of contractors
Knowledge
development
Desktop studies
Assessment studies
Feasibility studies
Reports
R&D projects
Patents
Knowledge
diffusion
through
networks
Conferences
Workshops
Platforms
Guidance of the
search
Positive expectations of renewable energies
Positive regulations on renewable energies
Negative expectations on renewable energies
Negative regulations on renewable energies
Market
formation
CO2 taxes
Feed-in rates
Environmental standards
Green labels
Expressed lack of feed-in rates
Expressed lack of environmental standards
Expressed lack of green labels
Resource
mobilisation
Subsidies
Investments
Expressed lack of subsidies
Expressed lack of investments
Creation of
legiti-
macy/counteract
resistance to
change
Lobby by agents to improve technical,
institutional and ﬁnancial conditions for
particular technology
Expressed lack of lobby by agents
Lobby for other technology that competes with
particular technology
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and results in a synthetic gas (syngas) that can be converted into
synthetic biodiesel or bio-ethanol by a catalytic process (e.g. the
Fischer-Tropsch process) [33].
1 Biosolids is a term used by the wastewater industry to designate the solid “left-
overs” after municipal and industrial sewage has undergone treatment to remove
disease causing pathogens and volatile organic matter. This treatment process is
usually carried out in an oxygen-enriched environment at a wastewater treatmentResistance to change by neighbours (NIMBY
attitude)
This article studies these companies by making use of
event-history analysis.’ Event-history analysis is a method that
onceptualizes development and change processes as sequences
f events, and in the words of Hekkert et al. [7], ‘encompasses con-
inuous and discontinuous causation, critical incidents, contextual
ffects and effects of formative patterns.’ Event-history analysis
as developed by Van de Ven and Poole [8] as a method for identify-
ng development patterns in qualitative data and has been applied
uccessfully in TIS studies by a number of researchers (i.e., [24,7,26].
his method has proven useful both for identifying patterns of tech-
ological development and diffusion in innovation systems and
or assessing policy initiatives aimed at inﬂuencing the rate and
irection of technological change.
To carry out the event history analysis, a database was  created
hat listed all relevant events for the four advanced biofuel com-
anies speciﬁcally and other relevant events within the Norwegian
dvanced biofuels ﬁeld more generally. This data was generated
hrough a review of Norwegian reports, technical news, news-
aper articles, research projects and publications, patent data,
nd national policy and legal documents that were published in
he period from when the Norwegian advanced biofuel industry
merged in 1998 up until 2015. The result was a database that
ncluded information about: the year or time period when the event
ook place, the company involved (if relevant), the data source, the
elated function in the TIS, the event category (for every system
unction a set of event categories was deﬁned, see Table 2) and a
escription of the positive or negative impact that the event had on
he development of the Norwegian TIS for advanced biofuels.
The events themselves were identiﬁed and categorized by
ollowing standard procedures for event-history analysis. In event- & Social Science 23 (2017) 125–135
history analysis, it is usual to distinguish between simple incidents
and events: while an incident is more or less an empirical observa-
tion, an event is a “conceptual construct in a model that explains
the patterns of incidents” [8] (p. 319). This implies that some inci-
dents were categorised as the same event, while other incidents
were categorised as multiple events. After the incidents were cate-
gorized into events, the events were further categorized according
to the functions of the technological innovation system and asso-
ciated event categories. The result of this exercise was  a rich and
structured data set that laid the foundation for the detailed narra-
tive of the Norwegian advanced biofuel industry that is presented
and analysed in Sections 5 and 6.
4. Technological background
Production techniques for conventional biofuels have been
developed and deployed over the last thirty years, with different
countries focusing on different types of fuel and utilising different
kinds of feedstock. Bioethanol has mainly been produced in the U.S.
(based on corn) and in Brazil (based on sugarcane), while biodiesel
has mainly been produced in Europe and in the U.S. (typically based
on rapeseed, soya bean and palm oil). However, researchers, gov-
ernments and NGOs have raised concerns about the sustainability
of conventional biofuels. They have pointed out that production of
conventional biofuels offers limited greenhouse gas (GHG) reduc-
tion beneﬁts, can contribute to higher food prices by competing
with food crops and has been linked to accelerated deforestation,
declining biodiversity and water shortages in regions with scarce
water resources (see, for instance, [32], p. 6). In the light of these
concerns, a new generation of biofuels (advanced biofuels) has
emerged that draws upon more recent scientiﬁc breakthroughs,
utilizes non-food feedstock and is less demanding with regard to
the use of land and water resources. There are presently many types
of so-called ‘advanced biofuels’ being produced and new types are
under development, but this article will focus on three types −
bioethanol, biodiesel and biogas.
Although advanced bioethanol, biodiesel and biogas can be pro-
duced from a variety of feedstock, Norwegian companies have
mainly produced (or have attempted to produce) bioethanol and
biodiesel from lignocellulosic biomass (such as leaves, tree bark,
straw, bagasse or woodchips) and biogas from biosolids1 (treated
sewage) and biowaste (food waste and slaughterhouse residues).
Norwegian companies use a variety of processes to produce these
biofuels, which can be classiﬁed into three main categories: a
thermo-chemical (biomass-to-liquid) approach, a bio-chemical
approach and anaerobic digestion (Fig. 1).
The thermo-chemical and bio-chemical approaches are used to
produce bioethanol and biodiesel. The thermo-chemical approach
involves heating the biomass with or without oxygen. When the
biomass is heated in the absence of oxygen, the process is called
pyrolysis and results in pyrolysic oils (bio-oils) that can be upgraded
by catalysis to high-value phenols and/or biofuels. When the
biomass is heated with oxygen the process is called gasiﬁcationplant tank, where bacteria and other microorganisms digest the organic matter (aer-
obic digestion). The biosolids consist primarily of the remains of the microorganisms
that have cleaned the sewage and can be processed further to create biogas and
fertilizer.
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Pre-treatment/ 
Inial processing 
stage
Feedstock
Main processing 
stage
Upgrading
Types of Fuels
Biosolids & Biowaste
Thermo Hydrolysis
Anaerobic digeson:
Conversion with 
microorganisms and heat
Water scrubbing or 
pressure swing adsorpon
Biomethane
Anaerobic  digeson path
Hydrolysis
Conversion with 
enzymes, heat and 
diluted acids or 
concentrated acids
Lignocellulose
Fermentaon
Biohydrogen, Bio -DME, DMF, HTU 
Diesel, Fischer -Tropsch  diesel (FTD)
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upgrading to 
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Thermo -chemical path Bio -chemical path
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synthesis 
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Gasiﬁcaon
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Gas condioning
Reﬁning, 
upgrading 
and 
upgrading of 
biofuels
Fig. 1. Technological approaches for the production of second generation biofuels.
Table 3
Development of TIS functions over time, 2001–2014 (N = 203).
2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 Total
Creation of legitimacy/counteract resistance to change 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 8 1 3 6 3 0 0 23
Entrepreneurial activities 1 0 0 0 0 5 2 6 5 8 4 0 1 0 32
Guidance of the search 2 0 1 0 1 1 0 4 2 0 2 0 2 3 18
Knowledge development 2 0 0 1 3 1 1 10 13 21 1 3 5 3 64
Knowledge diffusion through networks 1 0 0 0 0 2 0 2 4 7 2 1 0 2 21
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oMarket formation 0 0 0 0
Resource mobilisation 2 0 1 0
Total  8 1 2 0
The bio-chemical approach, on the other hand, is technique that
urns lignocellulosic biomass into ethanol in a four-stage process
34]. In the ﬁrst stage of the process, the pre-treatment, cellu-
ose, hemicellulose and lignin are separated, usually by means of
team heating, steam explosion or enzymatic pre-treatment (see
34]; Table 3). In the second stage, the hydrolysis, the cellulose and
emicellulose are hydrolysed into sugar molecules by the use of
nzymes, concentrated acids or diluted acids and heat. In the third
tage, the fermentation, the sugar molecules again are fermented to
roduce bioethanol. Finally, in the fourth stage, the upgrading, the
ioethanol is distilled. The bio-chemical approach is often applied
y integrated bioreﬁnery that separates biomass resources into
heir chemical building blocks and converts them into biofuels and
ther valuable chemical compounds [35,36], p. 2233).0 1 2 3 4 1 1 0 0 0 12
0 1 1 1 10 8 1 4 3 1 33
4 12 7 34 39 48 17 11 11 9 203
Anaerobic digestion is used to produce biogas from biosolids
and biowaste. The anaerobic digestion process normally com-
prises several stages. An optional ﬁrst stage (pre-treatment) is
often included where the biosolids or biowaste undergo a pre-
treatment to destroy and dissolve cell structures and naturally
occurring cell polymers (a form of protein) into an easily digestible
feed. In the second stage (main processing stage), the biosolids
and biowaste undergo an anaerobic digestion process in an oxy-
gen free/depleted environment where biogas is extracted from the
biomass by microorganisms [37]. Since the resulting biogas usually
consists of only 45–85% methane, a third upgrading stage is often
required before the biogas can be used as vehicle fuel. Through pro-
cesses such as water scrubbing or pressure swing adsorption [38],
the methane content can be increased to improve the power den-
sity of the fuel and hydrogen sulphide and volatile siloxanes can
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e removed to prevent damages to vehicles’ engines. The result is
io-methane − which usually consists of at least 97% pure methane
nd is chemically “identical” to natural gas.
. Event-history analysis
In our event-history analysis, we divide the evolution of the
orwegian advanced biofuels industry into four unevenly spaced
eriods: 1998–2005, 2006–2007, 2008–2011 and 2012–2014. This
ategorization follows previous work, such as [26], in dividing the
vent history thematically rather than symmetrically and grouping
ogether events based on whether they share common character-
stics rather than some arbitrary time interval. We  identify four
hemes that characterize the four different periods. The ﬁrst period
an be characterized as a period of ‘sporadic activities,’ since the
ctivity that took place in the biofuel industry was  mostly lim-
ted to irregular experimentation. The second period, on the other
and, can be described as a period of ‘commitment and confu-
ion,’ since both the companies and the government began to
xplore, in a somewhat disorderly manner, how biofuels could be
roduced sustainably and economically. The third period, how-
ver, can be characterized as a period of ‘industry formation,’ since
ompanies began to invest heavily in biofuels and the govern-
ent started to introduce policies to support these developments.
inally, the fourth period can be described as a period of ‘retraction
nd reorientation,’ since most companies terminated their large-
cale advanced biofuel activities and produced biofuel mostly as a
y- or niche product.
In our event history analysis, we make use of a total of 203 events
hat can be divided across the seven TIS functions (see Table 3
elow). We  use these events and associated functions to create a
arrative that account for how different aspects of the technolog-
cal innovation system shaped the development of the Norwegian
dvanced biofuel industry. Due to the sheer number of articles (inci-
ents) that the analysis draws upon, we will only occasionally refer
o individual articles in the narrative, but we provide a complete
ist of all the sources as Supplementary material to this article.
Although the focus of this article is on advanced biofuels, the
vent history analysis occasionally discusses related activities, such
s the production of ﬁrst generation biofuels and wood pellets.
hese related activities were part of the four case-study companies’
roduct portfolio, and events that affected these related activi-
ies also affected how these companies operated in the advanced
iofuels market. In this sense, the event history analysis covers
ome events that – strictly speaking – belong to other technologi-
al innovation systems, when these events affect the technological
nnovation system for advanced biofuels.
.1. First period: sporadic activity (1998–2005)
In the ﬁrst period – which lasted from the late 1990s to 2005
 there were only sporadic activities involving advanced biofuels.
ommercial involvement with bioenergy was mostly limited to the
roduction of ﬁrewood or pellets for stationary use in households,
nd the Norwegian government lacked, for most of the period, a
learly formulated biofuel policy. Nevertheless, there were some
mportant activities and events that took place in this period that
aid the foundation for the later evolution of an advanced biofuel
ndustry in Norway.
Among the most important events was the entrance of two
ew companies in the Norwegian advanced biofuels industry.
he ﬁrst company was Weyland, which was founded, in 2001,
y two researchers from the Bergen University College. The two
esearchers had developed a new technology for the production
f bioethanol using strong acid hydrolysis, and they established & Social Science 23 (2017) 125–135
Weyland to commercialise the technology. Their technology made
use of a process of recovery and recycling of the acid used in
the hydrolysis process that enabled them to produce bioethanol
from forest residuals much more economically. The other company
that entered the industry was Cambi. Cambi switched, during the
1990s, from producing wood pellets to extracting biogas through
anaerobic digestion. It developed a pre-treatment process – the
‘thermal hydrolysis process’ – that enabled it to increase the yield
of biogas, in close collaboration with researchers from the Nor-
wegian University of Science and Technology (NTNU) and other
European research organisations. Important milestones in Cambi’s
development included an agreement in 1998 with the largest UK
wastewater treatment company, Thames Water PLC, for the use of
its technology in the treatment of sewage and food waste and a
contract in 2001 to design and build a facility for the treatment of
food waste in Lillehammer, Norway.
Another important event was that Norske Skog – a Norwegian-
based, global producer of newsprint and magazine paper –
prepared to enter the advanced biofuel industry. In the early 2000s,
Norske Skog was in a critical economic situation, and a consultancy
suggested that it could improve its ﬁnancial situation by making use
of its forest residuals to produce synthetic biodiesel (consultancy
report, KanEnergi). However, Norske Skog found that it was difﬁ-
cult to raise capital and develop a reliable technology for producing
biodiesel. It therefore began to search for partners who could help
develop the technology and ﬁnd investors who would be willing to
invest in a new advanced biofuel venture.
The only company (of the four considered in this study)
which had continuous production of advanced biofuels throughout
this period, was  the chemical company, Borregaard [39]. Borre-
gaard produced, throughout this period, about 20 million litres
of bioethanol annually. The production of bioethanol was never-
theless not Borregaard’s primary activity, nor was the bioethanol
necessarily used as vehicle fuel. Its primary activity was  the extrac-
tion of valuable chemicals from woody resources, and bioethanol
was more of a by-product that it produced, largely, from residues
from its commercial reﬁnery operations.
In terms of government policy, advanced biofuels was, in this
period, a neglected area. Public funding for advanced biofuels was
not prioritized in Norwegian energy RD&D programmes, such as
Renergi. Although, the public industrial development organisation,
Innovation Norway, established a bioenergy programme in 2003
and the Government Declaration by the new Centre-Left Govern-
ment [40], in the autumn of 2005, spelt out a clear commitment
to foster the development of bioenergy – none of these initiatives
focused directly on advanced biofuels. Instead, these initiatives
were directed at fostering the production and use of bioenergy
and biofuels in general. Nevertheless, the representatives from the
industrial associations were keen to point out these shortcomings,
as they did in one instance, by criticising a study of sustainable
transportation that Econ Analyse carried out for the Ministry of
Transport for neglecting to discuss advanced biofuels.
5.2. Second period: commitment and confusion (2006–2007)
The second period was characterised by a growing commitment
by companies and the government to the production of biofuels,
but also an increasing confusion as to how this production could be
carried out both sustainably and economically.
During this period, both Cambi and Weyland became more
ambitious and expanded their operations. In 2006, Cambi began the
development and construction of a biowaste and biosolids treat-
ment facility in the municipality of Verdal. The facility treated food
waste and sewage for 41 municipalities in the geographical region
of Trøndelag and Helgeland and was at the time the largest facility
of its kind in Norway. Nevertheless, neither this facility nor Cambi’s
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xisting facility at Lillehammer made use in this period of the bio-
as to produce biofuels (bio methane); instead, they used the biogas
o produce electricity. In addition, the Verdal facility experienced
fﬁciency losses due to difﬁculties with sorting out non-biological
aste from the feedstock, and the Lillehammer facility received
omplaints from local residents arising from problems of limiting
nwanted odours – both events that led to much negative publicity.
eyland also embarked on a new commercial venture, commenc-
ng, in 2007–2008, with the development and construction of an
mbitious pilot plant to test its technology, with ﬁnancial backing
rom the Research Council of Norway.
Another important event in this period was that Norske Skog
egan to realize its ambitions of producing biodiesel by forming
 partnership with Norwegian investors and companies and for-
ign technology providers. Norske Skog agreed in 2006 with Hydro
now Statoil) to collaborate on a feasibility study that would inves-
igate the possibilities for biodiesel production in Norway. Norske
kog also explored possibilities for cooperation with the German
echnology provider, Choren. Choren had been involved in the
evelopment of an advanced BtL (biomass-to-liquid) process based
n gasiﬁcation of woody biomass and an FT synthesis into synthetic
iesel and could serve as a capable technology provider for Norske
kog [41], p. 6850). Nevertheless, at the end of 2007, Hydro (now
orsk Hydro) decided to establish its own advanced biofuel facil-
ty in Denmark based on straw as feedstock, and withdrew from
he cooperation with Norske Skog, partly because it considered
he costs of the project being too high. On the other hand, Norske
kog received some encouragement, when it learned that some of
he buses in the Norwegian capital, Oslo would start running on
iodiesel.
A related, but important event was that Borregaard became
nvolved in the production of conventional biofuels (or ﬁrst gen-
ration biofuels). In 2006, Borregaard took part in a joint venture
ogether with Habiol, Unikorn AS and Østfoldkorn AS to establish
he biofuel company, Uniol. Uniol, according to these compa-
ies’ plans, was supposed to build a large production facility for
iodiesel, with an annual production capacity of 100 million litres,
ased on soya oil, rapeseed oil and domestic slaughterhouse waste
s feedstock. This new venture came as an addition to Borregaard’s
xisting production of bioethanol, and not as a replacement.
In terms of government policy, the Norwegian government
howed an increased commitment in this period to foster the
evelopment and use of biofuels, but it was unclear whether the
overnment favoured the development and use of conventional
r advanced biofuels. The Norwegian government stated in the
hite Paper on Norwegian Climate Policy [42] a general ambition
or targeted and coordinated policy measures for increased use of
ioenergy (up to 14 TWh  by 2020), while also expressing a speciﬁc
eed for increased use of advanced biofuels. The government intro-
uced a tax exemption for bioethanol-based fuel for vehicles, as
ong as the new fuel was largely based on bioethanol. In response to
his, the oil company, Statoil, launched a new gasoline type in May
006 that included 85% bioethanol, known as E85. However, this
uel did not necessarily consist of advanced bioethanol, and Statoil
dmitted that the fuel was based on corn from Europe and sugar
ane from Brazil. In 2007, the Norwegian government extended
hese incentives by reducing the Vehicle Import Duty, on vehicles
unning on ethanol or mixed fuel (E85 cars) with of 10,000 NOK (ca.
200 Euro). Nevertheless, this policy prompted several Norwegian
nvironmental NGOs to request stronger sustainability criteria to
e applied to imported biofuels..3. Third period: industry formation (2008–2011)
The third period was characterized by a new industrial dynamic
n the advanced biofuels industry. Norwegian policy-makers intro- & Social Science 23 (2017) 125–135 131
duced a wide range of policies to further develop advanced biofuel
processing technologies and create a market for advanced biofuels.
The advanced biofuel companies responded to these policy changes
by undertaking considerable investment in pilot and demonstra-
tion plants in preparation for launching full-scale production.
Nevertheless, by the end of this period, few biofuel companies
had actually begun full-scale commercial production of advanced
biofuels.
In the third period, the Norwegian government took on a lead-
ing role and attempted to build a comprehensive policy framework
to support the advanced biofuel industry. It made an important
step towards building this policy framework, when it in 2008 man-
aged to convince the Norwegian Parliament (Stortinget) to sign
a bipartisan ‘Agreement on Climate Policy’ (“Klimaforliket”). This
agreement set a broad but ambitious agenda for emission cuts and
development of renewable technologies and prepared the ground
for more targeted strategies and policies that dealt speciﬁcally with
biofuels. These strategies and polices can loosely be grouped into
two categories – ‘push-based’ policies that encouraged the devel-
opment of advanced biofuel production processes and ‘pull-based’
policies that encouraged the use of advanced biofuels.
In terms of push-based policies, the government instructed its
subordinate agencies to put in place a broad range of mecha-
nisms for supporting research, development and demonstration
activities. The Research Council of Norway responded to these
instructions, in 2009, by signiﬁcantly increasing its funding for
advanced biofuels projects in its existing programmes (such as
Renergi) and by establishing a new centre dedicated to the devel-
opment of bioenergy (CenBio), which would carry out several R&D
projects on advanced biofuels. In the same year, the government
also established a new agency under the Ministry of Transport,
TRANSNOVA, which was  given the task of reducing CO2 emissions
by the transport sector through sponsoring demonstration projects
on new sustainable modes of transportation, where advanced bio-
fuels was one of several target areas. In 2010, Innovation Norway,
launched a new funding scheme for environmental technologies,
where a substantial amount of money was  set aside for pilot and
demonstration facilities designed to produce advanced biofuels.
In terms of ‘pull-based’ policies, the government made use of
two types of policy to bolster demand for biofuels – tax exemptions
on biofuels and minimum proportion targets on biofuels. Minimum
proportion targets on biofuel was a policy that the government used
to compel fuel retailers to blend bioethanol and biodiesel with the
conventional fuel that they sold. Although the policy required that
only a certain percentage of the gasoline and diesel that the retail-
ers sold was  bio-based, most retailers found that it was  easier to sell
the biofuel when they blended the biofuel with conventional fuel
in low concentrations, rather than to sell the biofuel separately or
in higher concentrations. The government introduced its ﬁrst min-
imum proportion target of 2.5% in 2009 and increased this target
to 3.5% in 2010. Although the minimum proportion policy ensured
a reliable market for biofuels, the target was  set lower and intro-
duced later than that which the political discourse had led many
NGOs and industrial actors to expect. In addition, the minimum
proportion was  not accompanied by any sustainability criteria that
could have favoured advanced biofuels over conventional biofuels.
The other type of policy that the government used to bolster
demand was  tax exemptions on biofuels. In Norway, vehicle fuel
has been subject to two forms of taxation – a ‘CO2 tax’ that places
a duty on climate gas emissions and a ‘road-use tax’ that pays for
highway maintenance and associated infrastructure. The two taxes
have historically been relatively high and in the period under inves-
tigation accounted for 45–55% of the pump price of conventional
fuels. Nevertheless, of these two  taxes, the road-use tax was by far
the largest – comprising about 46% of the pump price for gasoline
and about 40% for diesel, while the CO2 tax accounted for only about
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% of the pump price for gasoline and 6% for diesel.2 With regards
o the CO2 and road-use tax, the government continued to exempt
oth biodiesel and bioethanol from the CO2 taxes (a tax exemp-
ion from which they had beneﬁtted since 1991), but it made some
mportant changes in the road-use tax on biodiesel that would have
mportant ramiﬁcations for the biofuel industry.
Biodiesel had since 1999 been exempt from road-use tax in
ll concentrations. It was therefore in a very favourable situation
ompared to bioethanol, which was only exempt in concentra-
ions above 50% (see previous period). Since most retailers sold
iofuels blended with conventional fuel in low concentration and
iodiesel in lower concentrations had a much better tax proﬁle than
ioethanol. Biodiesel was practically the only biofuel that was  sold
n Norway up until 2010.
Nevertheless, this situation changed at the end of this period. In
he fall of 2009, the government decided to remove the exemption
rom road-use tax that biodiesel had enjoyed hitherto and subject
t to a 50% road-use tax from 2010 and a 100% road-use tax from
011. The government justiﬁed this decision publicly by pointing
ut that vehicles running on biofuels also contributed to the ero-
ion of roads and should therefore be subject to the same road-use
axes as conventional vehicles. The government also pointed out
hat as biofuels had become more popular, the costs of maintaining
he tax exemption had increased and argued that there were other
limate-change policies which offered more value for money [43].
evertheless, this decision was controversial even within the gov-
rnment, and the two smaller partners of the ‘Centre-Left coalition’
overnment – the Centre Party and the Socialist Left Party – fought
o maintain the tax exemption. Nevertheless, the coalition’s largest
artner, the Labour Party, was in a particularly strong position hav-
ng achieved a notable election result that fall and forced through
he removal of the tax exemption. Besides that, biogas was  neither
ubject to CO2 nor road-use taxes in any of the periods investigated
n this article.3
2 The pump prices of gasoline and diesel varied from day to day in this period, and
here were small adjustments in the taxes once or twice pr. year. Nevertheless, the
elative contribution of the CO2 tax and road-use tax to the pump price remained
airly stable. The following example illustrates how the percentage contribution of
he  CO2 tax and road-use tax was  calculated using data from Norsk Petroleumsin-
titutt: In 2009, the CO2 tax on gasoline was 0.84 NOK and the road-use tax was
.46 NOK, in addition a 25% value added tax was added to the pump price. If we
dd the value added tax to the CO2 and road-use tax, we get a CO2 tax on 1.05 NOK
nd a road-use tax on 5.58 NOK. With an average pump price of 12.02 NOK in 2009,
he CO2 tax on gasoline accounted for 9% of the pump price and the road-use tax
ccounted for 46% – and in combination the two taxes accounted for 55% of the
ump price for gasoline. In the same way, the CO2 tax on diesel was 0.57 NOK and
he road-use tax was 3.50 NOK, in addition a 25% value added tax was  added to the
ump price. If we  add the value added tax to the CO2 and road-use tax, we get a CO2
ax on 0.71 NOK and a road-use tax on 4.38 NOK. With an average pump price of
0.98 NOK in 2009, the CO2 tax on diesel accounted for 6% of the pump price and
he road-use tax accounted for 40% – and in combination the two taxes accounted
or  46% of the pump price of diesel.
3 Another demand-side factor that it would have been reasonable to assume
ffected investments in biofuels in Norway is the oil and gas prices. When oil and gas
rices increased considerably during the 2000s, biofuels should have become more
ompetitive vis-à-vis conventional gasoline and diesel and the demand for biofuels
hould have increased signiﬁcantly. Nevertheless, during this time period, the Nor-
egian gasoline and diesel prices remained fairly stable – for two  less than obvious
easons. First, the oil and gas sector in Norway comprised a considerable part of the
orwegian economy. When the oil and gas prices increased, the Norwegian cur-
ency – kroner – appreciated against foreign currencies, such as the US dollar. Since
ossil fuels are bought and sold globally, this appreciation made it less expensive for
orwegian gas stations to purchase gasoline and diesel, and they could offer these
uel types to their consumers for a more reasonable price. In this way, the Norwe-
ian currency functioned as a buffer that reduced the volatility in the gasoline and
iesel prices in Norway. Second, Norway introduced a number of fuel taxes, which
omprised a large share of the pump price of gasoline and diesel (see previous end-
ote). These taxes ensured that even a considerable increase in the purchasing price
f  gasoline and diesel for the gas stations, result in a modest percentagewise price
ncrease for the consumers (See Statistics Norway). & Social Science 23 (2017) 125–135
Borregaard experienced, in this period, both successes and
failures. Borregaard had invested considerable funds in Uniol, a
Fredrikstad-based company that was  to produce ﬁrst-generation
biodiesel. Uniol spent 360 million NOK (45 million euro) in this
period on the construction of a biofuel plant and commenced pro-
duction of biodiesel in the summer of 2009. Nevertheless, three
months later, Uniol closed down production, due to the withdrawal
of the tax exemption from road-use taxes on biodiesel. The expla-
nation given by representatives of Uniol was  that fuel retailers
no longer had any incentive to buy biodiesel. Biodiesel was  more
expensive than imported bioethanol and when neither received
any exemption from road-use taxes, the fuel retailers would only
import cheap bioethanol based on corn and sugar canes to cover
the government’s 3.5% minimum proportion target. This event was
widely covered in the media, and environmental NGOs and industry
associations strongly criticised the government for the inconsis-
tency and unpredictability of their environmental policies.
Nevertheless, Borregaard did much better with its bioethanol
production. In this period, Borregaard engaged in a wide range of
government sponsored research, development and demonstration
projects, receiving grants from ENOVA, the EU Framework Pro-
gramme  7 and the Research Council of Norway’s BIA-programme
to improve various aspects of its processes. Perhaps the most
prominent of these projects was  the development of the BALI pre-
treatment process, a process that reduced lignin inhibition and that
resulted in important patents and a publication in the prestigious
journal, Science [44], p. 17; [45]. Borregaard also became, in this
period, increasingly committed to supplying bioethanol for fuel
purposes, when it received a contract for supplying 1 million litres
of bioethanol annually to the public transport company, Ruter, to
help run its bus ﬂeet in Oslo.
Norske Skog’s ventures into advanced biofuels did not prove
very successful. In 2008, Norske Skog established, in collaboration
with the technology provider Choren in Germany, a new sub-
sidiary that aimed to produce diesel from wood-based resources
(BtL-diesel) – Xynergo. Since the technology was still not fully
developed, Xynergo started to collaborate with experts on the gasi-
ﬁcation of wood at the Norwegian research institute, Sintef, and
received in the following two  years substantial ﬁnancial support
for these development projects, from both public institutions, such
as TRANSNOVA and the Research Council of Norway, but also from
private investors, such as its own  parent company, Norske Skog,
and the oil company, Statoil.
Xynergo planned to establish one or two  full-scale plants for
the production of BtL in Norway. However, in 2010, the company
was in dire need of new investors, after Statoil withdrew from the
joint venture and Norske Skog announced that the ﬁnancial cri-
sis had put such a strain on the company that it did not want
to remain the majority shareholder in Xynergo. It was estimated
that a full-scale facility could be operational by 2015, provided it
received investments of 6–7 billion NOK (ca. 800 million Euro) [46].
However, in November 2010, Norske Skog decided to shut down
Xynergo because it was  unable to attract sufﬁcient investment.
Norske Skog’s decision came along with new reports from a Nor-
wegian research institute (Vestlandsforsking) suggesting potential
health threats associated with the use of biodiesel and announce-
ments from Xynergo’s technology provider, Choren, that it was
struggling to make its technology work and that it faced serious
ﬁnancial problems. Some months later, in July 2011, Choren went
bankrupt.
Weyland managed, in this period, to convince private companies
that they should invest in the company and public funding agen-
cies that they should support the development of its strong acid
hydrolysis technologies. Weyland managed to attract investment
from a wide range of companies, including the oil company Statoil-
Hydro, and received funding for several RD&D projects from among
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thers, Innovation Norway, the Research Council of Norway’s Ren-
rgi programme and the Nordic Top-level-initiative. Through the
D&D projects, Weyland collaborated with reputable companies
nd institutions, such as Sintef and Statoil in Norway, Inventia
n Sweden, VTT in Finland, DTU in Denmark, and Matis-Food in
celand. Nevertheless, despite involvement in several successful
D&D projects and ensuring patent protection for key features of its
echnology, Weyland was not able raise the 300–400 million NOK
equired to build a full-scale advanced bioethanol facility [46].
Cambi was possibly the advanced biofuel company that expe-
ienced the greatest commercial success. In this period, Cambi
mbarked on an international expansion and won contracts to build
iogas facilities throughout the world (including the U.S.A., Chile,
he Middle East, and the Baltic countries). At the same time, it also
ntered the biofuel industry in earnest. In 2011, among others, it
ommenced construction of a new facility on the outskirts of the
orwegian capital, Oslo, which was to supply 135 busses with bio-
ethane produced from the capital’s biological waste. Although
uch of Cambi’s success could be attributed to its prize-winning
echnologies and its well-executed strategies, it was  also helped
y EU legislation, such EU’s landﬁll directive (Council Directive
999/31/EC) which forced European municipalities to ﬁnd to alter-
ative ways of dealing with their biological waste than to deposit
t in landﬁlls.
.4. Fourth period: retraction and reorientation (2012–2014)
The fourth period was a period of retraction and reorienta-
ion. Most of the companies that had the ambition of producing
dvanced biofuels either ceased production or refocused their
ttention towards producing niche products, such as bio chemicals
nd bio pharmaceuticals.
The Norwegian government maintained, for most of this period,
ts existing biofuel policies, but mentioned that it considered
ithdrawing the tax exemption on bioethanol sold in higher con-
entrations. Nevertheless, at the end of 2013, there was  a change
f government, from a government based on a ‘Centre-Left coali-
ion’ to a Conservative minority government. The new Conservative
inority government was more positive towards biofuels and
radually introduced policies that were more favourable to the
dvanced biofuel industry. Among others, they introduced a sus-
ainability criterion that provided incentives for fuel retailers to sell
dvanced (second generation) rather than conventional (ﬁrst gen-
ration) biofuels and signalled that it would increase the minimum
roportion targets and reduce the road-use tax on biodiesel.
Industrial activity in the Norwegian advanced biofuel indus-
ry declined in this period. Borregaard maintained a low level of
roduction of advanced bioethanol based on residues from its pro-
uction of bio-based chemicals. Nevertheless, it made no effort
o expand its biofuel production and it expressed no interest in
ncreasing its Norwegian biofuel production in the future. At the
ame time, Weyland found itself unable to raise sufﬁcient invest-
ents to build a production plant based on its technologies, and
egan to consider moving to the US and focus on bio chemicals
ather than biofuels. And with Xynergo gone, there were no other
ompanies that had developed or produced advanced biodiesel. The
nly exception was Cambi, which beneﬁtted from tighter regula-
ion on organic waste treatment and continued to expand its biogas
usiness both in Norway and globally.
By the end of 2014, the advanced biofuel industry consisted
f some distributed biogas facilities and small-scale plants for
ioethanol production that produced fuel mostly for public trans-
ort. Nevertheless, some new industrial initiatives began to emerge
s a response to a more favourable policy environment. One of these & Social Science 23 (2017) 125–135 133
initiatives, among others, involved using wood-base resources to
produce aviation fuel.
6. Discussion and conclusions
Based on this analysis, we can now discuss which of the three
competing claims best account for Norway’s lacklustre perfor-
mance in advanced biofuels – a lack of risk capital, a lack of expertise
or insufﬁcient or inadequate government incentives and support
measures.
Based on the event history analysis, the article ﬁnds some
support for the ﬁrst explanation. The ﬁrst explanation suggested
that the petroleum sector acquired the available risk capital that
could have funded promising advanced biofuel projects, and we
deﬁned this explanation (in the theory section) as a ‘capital short-
age’ failure, dominated by the functions ‘resource mobilisation’ and
‘entrepreneurial activities.’ Particularly in the ﬁrst two periods and
the initial part of Period 3 (1998–2009), the event history analysis
found few events related to a lack of risk capital and many events
related to entrepreneurial activity. Not only did the advanced bio-
fuel companies manage to raise sufﬁcient capital to develop and
demonstrate their technologies, they also received a considerable
amount of their funds from petroleum companies, such as Statoil
and Hydro (which later merged to form StatoilHydro (2007–2009)
and then Statoil). In this sense, there was  little evidence of ‘capital
shortage’ failure in this period, since both the functions resource
mobilisation and entrepreneurial activities were strong and inter-
acted positively with the rest of the TIS.
Nevertheless, this situation changed in the latter part of Period
3, when both Xynergo and Weyland were unable to obtain suf-
ﬁcient capital to commence full-scale production of advanced
biofuels. However, Xynergo and Weyland tried at that time to raise
capital after the government had withdrawn the tax exemption
on biodiesel. This event was  probably one of the main reasons
why investors were unwilling to fund their production plants (in
addition to the problems Xynergo faced, among others, with its
technology provider, Choren). In this sense, the lack of risk cap-
ital was as much a symptom of a changing policy regime as any
real shortage of risk capital and illustrates how functions such
as guidance of search interacts with resource mobilization and
entrepreneurial activity.
The article ﬁnds only limited support for the second explanation.
The second explanation suggested that Norway lacked the relevant
technological expertise to exploit advanced biofuel opportunities,
and we  deﬁned this explanation as an ‘absence of expertise’ failure,
dominated by the functions ‘knowledge development,’ ‘knowledge
diffusion’ and ‘resource mobilisation’. The event history analysis
found that the Norwegian companies carried out a great deal of
R&D and exchanged knowledge and expertise with other compa-
nies and research institutions, both nationally and internationally.
Most of the Norwegian companies – such as Borregaard, Weyland
and Cambi – also developed their own  processing technologies
and these technologies were considered to be at the forefront of
international developments. However, Xynergo proved to be the
exception. It did not develop its own  advanced biodiesel tech-
nology and had to licence its BtL technology from the German
company, Choren. In this sense, there was  little evidence of absence
of expertise failure, since both the functions knowledge diffusion
and resource mobilisation were strong and interacted positively
with the rest of the TIS.
The article does, however, ﬁnd support for the third explanation.
The third explanation suggested that the Norwegian government
had failed to provide adequate incentives and support measures
to stimulate development and production of advanced biofuels,
and we deﬁned this explanation as a ‘policy insufﬁciency’ failure,
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ominated by the functions ‘guidance of the search,’ ‘market for-
ation,’ ‘the creation of legitimacy and counteracting resistance
o change’ and ‘resource mobilisation.’ In the event history analy-
is, we saw that the government supported the advanced biofuel
ndustry through push-based and pull-based policies. The push-
ased policies involved a number of RD&D programmes that the
overnment introduced to support the advanced biofuel indus-
ry. Although these RD&D programmes started later and were
unded less generously than comparable programmes in other
uropean countries, the event-history analysis found that the pro-
rammes were popular among the advanced biofuel companies
nd contributed positively to these companies’ capability building.
n this sense, the government strengthened the resource mobili-
ation in the system and this function interacted positively with
ntrepreneurship and helped spawn some of the ﬁrst Norwegian
dvanced biofuel ventures.
The event history analysis also points to some critical govern-
ent decisions that seemed to have had a particularly negative
mpact on the advanced biofuel industry. The pull-based policies,
n contrast, involved tax exemptions and minimum proportion
argets that the government introduced to stimulate the demand
or biofuels. The event history analysis found that the pull-based
olicies initially provided strong incentives for fuel retailers to
ell biodiesel blends and that the advanced biofuel companies
esponded to this by investing heavily in the production and
evelopment of ﬁrst-generation (Uniol) and second-generation
Xynergo) biodiesel. Nevertheless, when the government unex-
ectedly removed the exemption on road-use tax on biodiesel in
009, it set in motion a series of events. First, the fuel retailers
witched from biodiesel to bioethanol, and biodiesel companies,
uch as Uniol and Xynergo, went out of business. Then, the uncer-
ainty surrounding future biofuel policies prevented Weyland from
cquiring the necessary capital to start full-scale production and
onvinced Borregaard to abandon any future plans of expanding
ts bioethanol production in Norway. In this sense, the event his-
ory analysis illustrates how a negative event related to ‘market
ormation’ (introduction of road-use tax) ﬁrst spreads to ‘guid-
nce of search’ (uncertainty about future policies), then to ‘resource
obilization’ (lack of risk capital) and ‘entrepreneurial activity’
diminished interest in biofuel production) – and ﬁnally bringing
he whole advanced biofuel based innovation system to a halt.
In conclusion, the analysis in this article has highlighted how
mportant an adequate and consistent policy regime is for the
evelopment of an advanced biofuel industry. Contrary to pop-
lar belief, the article has shown that the oil sector was not so
esource demanding that there was no available risk capital to fund
romising advanced biofuel projects in Norway or that the Norwe-
ian knowledge base was so entrenched in hydro carbon extraction
hat the country simply lacked the relevant technological expertise
o successfully exploit advanced biofuel opportunities. Both a lack
f risk capital and a lack of relevant knowledge might have con-
ributed to Norway’s lacklustre performance in advanced biofuels,
ut these factors were not the primary reasons. The article ﬁnds
hat the primary reason for Norway’s lacklustre performance was
hat the Norwegian government failed to provide a reliable and pre-
ictable policy regime which would stimulate the development and
roduction of advanced biofuels. In this sense, the article ﬁnds that
he Norwegian petroleum industry cannot be blamed directly for
orway’s lacklustre performance in advanced biofuels. Neverthe-
ess, it remains an open question whether the petroleum industry
ffected the advanced biofuel industry indirectly, by shaping the
olicy framework through, among other methods, lobbying.The analysis carried out in the article has implications for both
heory and policy. In terms of theory, the analysis clearly shows
hat old, incumbent industries can have both a positive and a neg-
tive inﬂuence on new, green industries. Although the oil and gas & Social Science 23 (2017) 125–135
companies produced the main competing products and they might
have lobbied against advanced biofuels, they also provided fund-
ing for technological development and construction of the ﬁrst
demonstration plants. In this sense, the analysis shows that future
research needs to take into account the dual role that old, incum-
bent industries can play with regards to new, green industries,
and it illustrates the need for contextual approaches within the
TIS approach, such as Bergek et al. [16], that can account for the
interaction between old and new industries.
In terms of policy, the analysis highlights two main implica-
tions. The ﬁrst implication is that push-based approaches alone are
insufﬁcient to develop an advanced biofuel industry. The analysis
found that the emergence and growth of the Norwegian advanced
biofuel industry required the combination of both pull-based tax
incentives and regulations and push-based RD&D. The second
implication is that an inconsistent policy support can have a detri-
mental effect on the development of new green industries. The
analysis found that the main reason for the Norwegian advanced
biofuel industry’s lacklustre performance was the uncertainty that
was created when the government reinstated taxes on bio-diesel.
In closing, we want to point to some limitations of this study
and provide some suggestions for future research. This article
is based primarily on an analysis of written material (such as
Norwegian reports, technical news, newspaper articles, research
projects and publications, patent data, and national policy and legal
documents) and such sources tend to highlight dramatic and well-
publicized events. Other sources, such as in-depth interviews with
businesses, industry associations, NGOs and policy makers, could
provide greater detail about the motivations of the various actors
and more insights about subtle processes or events that did not
reached the public eye. Such sources could have shed more light
on whether the petroleum industry exerted any political inﬂuence
over the advanced biofuel industry. This question, however, must
be consigned to future research.
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